Abstract-In this paper, we propose a similarity searchable encryption in the symmetric key setting for Euclidean distance, by extending the functional encryption scheme for inner product proposed by Bishop et al. [2] . Our scheme performs predetermined encoding independently of vectors x and y, and it obtains the Euclidean distance between the two vectors while they remain encrypted.
I. INTRODUCTION
Searchable encryption is a new paradigm, which allows similar data to be searched within an encrypted database. Most prior studies on searchable encryption [4] [5] have focused on searching exactly-matching data. We are, however, interested in searching the similar data of a certain distance.
Bishop et al. [2] recently proposed a new functional encryption (FE) scheme for inner product in the symmetric key setting. Their scheme uses asymmetric bilinear maps, and is secure against unbounded collusion under a simple assumption. They focused on function privacy in FE for inner product. Intuitively speaking, function privacy requires that given a decryption key K f for a function f , one should not be able to learn any unnecessary information about f .
Besides inner product, Euclidean distance is very commonly used to measure the distance. Oosawa et al. [14] proposed a system called a SYNAPSE Case Matching which is a content-based image retrieval system that supports lung cancer image diagnosis. In their system, Euclidean distance is used to measure the distance between a patient's lung image and each data in the medical case database, wherein the image has multiple parameters, such as color, figure, and size.
One scenario we consider is that a user searches similar symptom data of a certain Euclidean distance from an encrypted medical case database, providing his/her own encrypted user's information as a query to the Cloud. Using similar symptom data, he/she can receive useful advice for improving health. Another scenario is to analyze users' behavior using GPS information from their smartphone. In these scenarios, not only the user's information and the GPS information, it is necessary to protect but also the database for user's privacy.
A. Our Results
In this paper, we define the notion of similarity searchable encryption for Euclidean distance. In similarity searchable encryption for Euclidean distance, we consider two objects: queries and encrypted data. Our notion is considered in the symmetric key setting in the sense that both of queries and encrypted database cannot be generated without a master secret key. Using queries, we can search on the encrypted database for similar data. Here, we adopt Euclidean distance as an index of similarity. In our security notion, we require that both queries and encrypted database do not reveal any information more than necessary.
To obtain a scheme satisfying our requirements, we show a generic construction of similarity searchable encryption for Euclidean distance from any functional encryption for inner product (with function privacy). By starting from the functional encryption schemes for inner product in the literature [2] , [6] , we can obtain similarity searchable encryption schemes for Euclidean distance.
B. Related Works
A similar line of study is searchable encryption, which allows one to search on encrypted database. Most prior studies on searchable encryption [5] , [4] have focused mainly on searching the database to find an exact match to the query. We consider more complicated queries. That is, we search on encrypted data to find data that is within certain distance from the query.
In our conversion, we require certain form of functional encryption. The notion of functional encryption was proposed in the work of [3] . Later, Garg et al. proposed a construction of functional encryption based on indistinguishability obfuscation [8] . Since the current candidate constructions for indistinguishability obfuscation are extremely inefficient, their scheme is not practical. Subsequently, functional encryption for inner product, which is a special case of the more general notion of functional encryption, was proposed by Abdalla et al [1] . Their construction is considered in the public key setting and they do not consider function privacy, which means that an attribute associated to a key can be leaked. Later, functional encryption for inner product in the symmetric key setting with function ISITA2016, Monterey, California, USA, October 30-November 2, 2016
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Prior studies [12] [7] took a similar approach to our scheme, which uses inner product encryption to compute Euclidean distances. However, their schemes require multiround transactions, which is not needed in our scheme.
We note that essentially the same encoding as ours was used in the work of Guo et al. [10] who constructed predicate encryption that can deal with Euclidean distances by incorporating a predicate encryption for inner product with the encoding. A crucial difference from their work is that in our work, we deal with secret key functional encryption with anonymity and function privacy, whereas they consider public key predicate encryption without them. Function privacy is necessary for our application to searchable encryption.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Inner product Encryption
Inner product encryption, which is also called functional encryption for inner product, is a special case of functional encryption [8] . In inner product encryption, secret keys and ciphertexts are associated with vectors. When one decrypts a ciphertext using a secret key, one obtains the inner product of these vectors. Inner product encryption is defined as follows.
Definition: Inner product Encryption Let x and y be vectors in Z n p :
Inner product encryption consists of the following four algorithms: IPE.Setup, IPE.Encrypt, IPE.KeyGen, and IPE.Decrypt. We note that the length of the bit representation of p is bounded by some polynomial of the security parameter λ.
The setup algorithm takes the security parameter λ and the length of vectors n as input, and outputs a public parameters pp and a master secret key msk.
IPE.Encrypt(x, msk, pp) → C x
The encryption algorithm takes a vector x ∈ Z n p , the master secret key msk, and the public parameters pp as input, and outputs a ciphertext C x .
IPE.KeyGen(y, msk, pp) → K y The key generation algorithm takes the vector y ∈ Z n p , the master secret key msk, and the public parameters pp as input, and outputs a decryption key K y .
The decryption algorithm takes a ciphertext C x , the decryption key K y , and the public parameters pp as input, and outputs m.
For Correctness, we require the following. Correctness: We assume that (pp, msk) is the output of IPE.Setup(1 λ , 1 n ), C x is the output of IPE.Encrypt(x, msk, pp), and K y is the output of IPE.KeyGen(y, msk, pp). We require the output m of IPE.Decrypt(C x , K y , pp) be the inner product of x and y. Namely, we require m = x, y = n−1 i=0 x i y i . Security for inner production encryption is defined in Appendix.
B. Weighted Euclidean distance
The weighted Euclidean distance is a generalization of the ordinary Euclidian distance and parametrized by {w i } n i=1 . The weighted Euclidean distance between the vector x ∈ Z n p and y ∈ Z n p is defined as the the square root of dist, which is defined as follows.
III. PRIVATE SIMILARITY SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION SPECIFICATIONS AND SECURITY DEFINITIONS
A. Model
Let us consider the following scenario, which is a use case of our scheme proposed in this paper. We will consider a system that consists of a user, a server, and a database owner. The user generates a query and encrypts the query. The database owner encrypts a reference record in the database and sends the encrypted reference record to the server. The server extracts the similar data from the encrypted database using the encrypted query and the encrypted reference record. We adopt Euclidean distance as an index of similarity. The server obtains the Euclidean distance between the query and the reference record while the query and the reference record remain encrypted. It is necessary to ensure the confidentiality of both of the query and of the reference record in the server. To capture this scenario, we propose the notion of similarity searchable encryption, which is defined as follows.
Definition: Private Similarity Searchable Encryption
The query x and the reference record y are n-length vectors over a finite field Z p . We note that the length of the bit representation of p is bounded by some polynomial of the security parameter λ.
A similarity searchable encryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms, Setup, Query, EncDB, and Dist:
The setup algorithm takes the security parameter λ, and the length of vectors n as input, and outputs public parameters pp and a master secret key msk.
Query(x, msk, pp) → Q x The query algorithm takes a vector x ∈ Z n p , the master secret key msk, and the public parameters pp as input, and outputs a query Query x .
EncDB(y, msk, pp) → D y
The database encryption algorithm takes a vector y ∈ Z n p , the
The distance measurement algorithm takes the query Q x , the encrypted record D y , and the public parameters pp as input, and outputs the Euclidean distance Z.
For correctness, we require the following. Correctness: We assume that (pp, msk) is the output of Setup(1 λ , 1 n ), and Q x and D y are the output of Query(x, msk, pp) and EncDB(y, msk, pp), respectively. We require the output Z of Dist(Q x , D y , pp) be dist(x, y) .
B. Security definitions
Here we define security for similarity searchable encryption. We need to guarantee that queries {Q x } and encrypted records {D y } do not reveal any information beyond their Euclidian distances. We define the security using the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup game:
C runs Setup to generate msk and pp. It gives pp to A. C picks a random b ∈ {0, 1}. A can adaptively ask C for the above queries. However, we require that for all x 0 , x 1 and y 0 , y 1 that are queried in the Challenge1 phase and Challenge2 phase respectively, it hold that dist(x 0 , y 0 ) = dist(x 1 , y 1 ).
Guess:
A outputs b and wins the game if b = b . We define A's advantage in breaking the security of the similarity searchable encryption scheme as
We say that the similarity searchable encryption scheme achieves full privacy if the advantage of the adversary A is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Weaker Security Notion. We can consider a weaker security notion in which the queries of the adversary are restricted to satisfy
for all (x 0 , x 1 ) and (y 0 , y 1 ). If the advantage of the adversary is negligible in this (modified) game, we say that the scheme satisfies weak privacy.
IV. CONSTRUCTION
A. Construction using inner product encryption
In this section, we show a generic construction of a similarity searchable encryption scheme for weighted Euclidean distance (Setup, Query, EncDB, Dist) from an inner product encryption scheme (IPE.Setup, IPE.KeyGen, IPE.Encrypt, IPE.Decrypt). The conversion is completely generic and based on the idea of encoding vectors so that their inner product corresponds to the (square of) distance between them.
The setup algorithm takes the security parameter λ and the length of vectors n as input, and runs IPE.Setup(1 λ , 1 n+2 ) to obtain (pp, msk). It outputs public parameters pp and a master secret key msk.
Query(x, msk, pp) :
The query algorithm takes a vector x ∈ Z n p , the master secret key msk, and the public parameters pp as input. It first applies the encoding algorithm Encode 1 , which is defined in the following, to x.
, where
. . .
Then, it runs IPE.KeyGen(x , msk, pp) → Q x and outputs Q x .
EncDB(y, msk, pp) :
The database encryption algorithm takes a vector y ∈ Z n p , the master secret key msk, and the public parameters pp as input. It first applies the encoding algorithm Encode 2 , which is defined in the following, to the vector y. Correctness: The correctness of the resulting scheme (i.e., the similarity searchable encryption scheme) follows from Encode 2 (y) .
Proof:
dist(x, y) = n−1 i=0 w i (x i − y i ) 2 = n−1 i=0 w i x 2 i + n−1 i=0 w i y 2 i − 2 n−1 i=0 w i x i y i = Encode 1 (x),
B. Security Proof
In this section, we prove the following theorem, which addresses the security of our construction. Proof: We prove the former part of the theorem. The latter part can be proven similarly. Toward a contradiction, we assume an adversary A who breaks the full privacy of the private similarity searchable encryption scheme. From the adversary A, we construct another adversary B against the underlying inner product encryption scheme.
Adversary B:
1) B receives pp from its challenger C that has run IPE.Setup. It gives pp to A.
2) During the game, A chooses a query
Then, B runs Encode 1 as follows and gives (x 0 , x 1 ) to the challenger C. Due to the constraints in the query made by A, dist(x 0 , y 0 ) = dist(x 1 , y 1 ) holds for all queried (x 0 , x 1 )   and (y 0 , y 1 ). Therefore, for all (x 0 , x 1 ) and (y 0 , y 1 ) defined above, it holds that
Therefore, B only makes valid queries in the game. Furthermore, it can be easily seen that the advantage of B is the same as that of A. By our assumption that the advantage of A is non-negligible, B's advantage is non-negligible as well. We conclude the proof of the theorem.
V. INSTANTIATIONS
A. Instantiation based on [2]
Bishop et al. [2] constructed a (function private) inner product encryption scheme using Dual Pairing Vector Spaces [13] . The scheme satisfies weak privacy under the SXDH assumption. By applying our conversion in Section IV-A to the scheme, we obtain a private similarity searchable encryption scheme with weak privacy. We write down the resulting scheme in the following. We note that there is a restriction on the scheme that the output of Dist be polynomial size in the security parameter. This restriction is inherited from [2] .
In the scheme, we will use asymmetric bilinear groups consisting of G 1 , G 2 , G T , all with prime order p. The groups are equipped with an efficiently computable map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T that satisfies the following two properties: 
Query(x, msk, pp) : The query algorithm takes a vector x = (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) ∈ Z n p , the master secret key msk, and the public parameters pp as input. It first computes x = (x 0 , . . . , x n+1 ) = Encode 1 (x) (as in Section IV-A). Then, it defines x = (0, 1, x 0 , . . . , x n+1 ) = (x 0 , . . . , x n+3 ) 1 and computes the encrypted query Q x = (Q x,1 , Q x,2 ) as follows.
EncDB(y, msk, pp) : The database encryption algorithm takes a vector y = (y 0 , . . . , y n−1 ) ∈ Z n p , the master secret key msk, and the public parameters pp as input. It first computes y = (y 0 , . . . , y n+1 ) = Encode 2 (y) (as in Section IV-A). Then, it defines y = (1, 0, y 0 , . . . , y n+1 ) = (y 0 , . . . , y n+3 ). It then picks random α, α * ∈ Z p and outputs the encrypted record D y = (D y,1 , D y,2 ) computed as follows.
The distance measurement algorithm takes Q x = (Q x,1 , Q x,2 ), D y = (D y,1 , D y,2 ) , and the public parameters pp as input. Then it computes Z = dist(x, y) as follows. It first computes
It then computes a Z ∈ Z p such that D Z 2 = D 1 , and outputs Z. We note that we can guarantee that the Dist algorithm will run in polynomial time when the value of x, y is bounded by some fixed polynomial. It can be easily seen that Z is the Euclidean distance between x and y.
B. Instantiation based on [6]
As we have seen, since the inner product encryption by [2] only achieves weak privacy, so does the resulting private similarity searchable encryption scheme obtained by the conversion in IV-A. Very recently, Datta et al. [6] proposed an inner product encryption scheme with full privacy (rather than weak privacy). Their scheme is similar to that of [2] , but slightly more inefficient. By starting from their scheme, we obtain a private similarity searchable encryption scheme with full privacy.
APPENDIX
We present here a summary of the security definition of inner product encryption. The definition of security states that a decryption key K y and a ciphertext C x do not reveal any information about x, y. We define security using the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup game IP E:
C runs IPE.Setup to generate msk and pp. It gives pp to A. C also picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Challenge1 IP E:
A sends C two vectors x 0 , x 1 on which it wishes to be challenged. A can adaptively ask the challenger for above queries in arbitrary many times and an arbitrarily order. However, we require that for all x 0 , x 1 and y 0 , y 1 that are queried in Challenge1 IP E and Challenge2 IP E, respectively, it hold that x 0 , y 0 = x 1 , y 1 .
Guess IP E:
A outputs b and wins the game if b = b . We define A's advantage in breaking the inner product encryption scheme as
We say that the inner product encryption scheme satisfies full privacy if the advantage of the adversary A is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Weaker Security Notion. We can consider a weaker security notion in which the queries of an adversary are restricted to satisfy x 0 , y 0 = x 0 , y 1 = x 1 , y 1 = x 1 , y 0 for all (x 0 , x 1 ) and (y 0 , y 1 ). If the advantage of any adversary A is negligible in this (modified) game, we say that the scheme satisfies weak privacy.
